Cornelison v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42996 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-25-2016
Cornelison v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42996
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Cornelison v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42996" (2016). Not Reported. 2224.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2224
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
MARK WAYNE CORNELISON, 
 
 Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
 Defendant-Respondent. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
No. 42996 
 
Twin Falls Co. Case No.  
CV-2014-2093 
 
 
 
________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
________________________ 
 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
________________________ 
 
 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho  83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
RESPONDENT 
 
MARK WAYNE CORNELISON 
Inmate #64354 
I.S.C.I. 
P. O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho  83707 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRO SE 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1 
 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 2 
 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3 
 
I. Cornelison Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
Erred By Concluding Counsel Was Not Ineffective For 
Electing To Not File A Motion To Suppress Evidence 
Because Such A Motion Would Not Have Been Granted ................ 3 
 
  A. Introduction ........................................................................... 3 
 
  B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 3 
 
  C. Cornelison Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance 
   Of Counsel Because Any Motion To Suppress 
   Would Necessarily Have Failed ............................................ 3 
 
II. Cornelison Failed To Show That The District Court 
Erred By Concluding Counsel Was Not Ineffective In 
Relation To Sentencing ................................................................... 5 
 
  A. Introduction ........................................................................... 5 
 
  B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 6 
 
  C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The 
   Record Disproved Cornelison’s Allegations Of 
   Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At Sentencing ................. 7 
 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 9 
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 10 
 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 348 P.3d 145 (2015) .......................................... 4 
Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 351 P.3d 636 (Ct. App. 2015) .......................... 4 
Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 927 P.2d 910 (Ct. App.1996) ............................. 7 
DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009) .................................... 4 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001) ............................................. 6 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................ 6 
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000) .................................................. 7 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................ 4 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) ....................................................... 4, 5 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989) .................................. 7 
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987) ....................................... 5 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ........................................... 7 
State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 181 P.3d 1231 (2008) .......................................... 4 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................ 4, 7 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) ..................................................... 4 
Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 266 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................ 4, 7, 8 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007) ................................... 3, 7 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-4906 ....................................................................................................... 7 
 
1 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Mark Wayne Cornelison appeals from the summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Cornelison pled guilty to felony DUI with a persistent violator 
enhancement.  (R., p. 171.)  The district court sentenced him to 20 years with 10 
years determinate.  (R., pp. 191-94.)  He initiated the current action by filing a 
petition for post-conviction relief.  (R., pp. 5-8.)  In his petition, Cornelison 
asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to 
suppress evidence of a blood draw.  (R., p. 7.)  In his affidavit, Cornelison 
included allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately argue 
mental health at sentencing.  (R., pp. 15-16.)   
The state filed an answer and a motion to dismiss.  (R., pp. 60-67, 90-91.)  
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, rejecting the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence gathered as 
a result of a blood draw “because Cornelison cannot show that such a motion, if 
filed, would have succeeded.”  (R., pp. 270-77.)  The district court also 
addressed, and dismissed, the “claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing.  (R., pp. 277-79.)  Cornelison appealed from the district court’s 
judgment dismissing the case.  (R., pp. 281, 287.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Cornelison states the issues on appeal as: 
1. District court erred in it’s interpretation of Line 6 of the parole 
agreement, and by not reading the parole agreement in its 
entirety, or as a whole. 
 
2. District court erred in it’s interpretation of facts in, State v. 
Ellis, and failed to recognize that higher courts find parolee’s 
do maintain some Federal Constitutional rights. 
 
3. District court failed to recognize Parolee’s ability to withdraw 
consent to the Parole Agreement, as stated in Cornelison’s 4 
page, hand written brief, dated the 16th day of January, and 
marked received by court January 22.  [Exhibit #4.] 
 
4. District court failed to recognize, and still fails to recognize 
the date that Suzannes Cooper’s mental health report was 
filed with court.  [Exhibit #5.]  Therefore, District court failed 
to adequately rule on Cornelison’s mental health claim. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (some capitalization altered, otherwise verbatim).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Cornelison failed to show that the district court erred by concluding 
counsel was not ineffective for electing to not file a motion to suppress evidence 
because such a motion would not have been granted? 
 
2. Has Cornelison failed to show that the district court erred by concluding 
counsel was not ineffective in relation to sentencing? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Cornelison Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Concluding 
Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Electing To Not File A Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Because Such A Motion Would Not Have Been Granted 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court concluded that Cornelison failed to establish a prima 
facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to 
suppress evidence of his blood draw because such a motion would not have 
been granted.  (R., p. 270.)  Specifically, such a motion would have failed 
because “Cornelison was out on parole at the time of the search in question, and 
it is clear from the record that he waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his 
parole agreement.”  (R., pp. 275-76.)  Application of the relevant legal standards 
shows the district court’s analysis was correct. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
 
C. Cornelison Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Because 
Any Motion To Suppress Would Necessarily Have Failed 
 
To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present 
admissible evidence making out a prima facie case as to each essential element 
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of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof.  Adams v. 
State, 158 Idaho 530, 537, 348 P.3d 145, 152 (2015); DeRushé v. State, 146 
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 
710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 2015); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).  The elements of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim are deficient performance and prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Where a post-conviction petitioner 
alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion, “a conclusion that 
the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court is generally 
determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.”  Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 
67-68, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172-73 (Ct. App. 2011).  Here the district court 
concluded that, if pursued, a motion to suppress evidence of the blood draw 
would not have been granted.  (R., pp. 270-76.)  Application of relevant Fourth 
Amendment legal standards supports the district court’s ruling. 
“A person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched.”  State v. 
Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008).  To meet this burden 
the moving party must demonstrate both “a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the challenged search” and that “society [is] willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.”  Id.   
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against 
governmental intrusion.  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).  “[P]ersons conditionally released to 
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societies have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by 
government authorities ‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be unreasonable or 
invalid under traditional constitutional concepts.”  State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 
841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987).  Thus, “the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.”  
Samson, 547 U.S. at 856. 
Here it was “undisputed that Cornelison was out on parole at the time of 
the search in question, and it is clear from the record that he waived his Fourth 
Amendment rights in his parole agreement.”  (R., p. 275.)  Condition 6 of his 
parole agreement “required Cornelison to ‘freely cooperate and voluntarily submit 
to medical and chemical tests and examinations for the purpose of determining if 
parolee is using, or under the influence of alcohol or narcotics ….’”  (R., p. 276.)  
“Such waiver included ‘medical and chemical tests and examinations for the 
purpose of determining if parolee is using, or under the influence of alcohol,’ 
which is exactly what occurred with the blood draw in question.”  (Id.)  The district 
court did not err in concluding that the motion to suppress would not have been 
granted, and therefore Cornelison did not support a prima facie claim of either 
deficient performance or prejudice. 
 
II. 
Cornelison Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Concluding Counsel 
Was Not Ineffective In Relation To Sentencing 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Cornelison alleged that, although the court at sentencing had the reports 
of two psychologists, it lacked the report of Susanne Cooper, a clinical social 
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worker.  (R., p. 15.)  He claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek a 
continuance to present Cooper’s report (and that it had to be presented by a Rule 
35 motion) and failing to “say anything about [his] mental health issues” at 
sentencing.  (R., pp. 15-16.)  The district court found these claims disproved by 
the record in the criminal case, because Cooper’s report was in fact before the 
sentencing court and in denying the Rule 35 motion the sentencing judge stated 
that mental health did not play a significant role because the sentence was 
required to protect the community.  (R., pp. 277-79.)  Review shows the district 
court was correct.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, would require relief to be granted.  
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992).  The 
Court freely reviews the district court’s application of the law.  Id. at 434, 835 
P.2d at 669.  However, the Court is not required to accept either the applicant’s 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant’s conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 
112 (2001). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Record Disproved 
Cornelison’s Allegations Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At 
Sentencing 
 
“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s claims.  Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  “Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly 
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a 
matter of law.”  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989).  When a defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion, “the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in 
question in determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent 
performance.”  Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 
2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. 
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App.1996)).  “Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial 
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.”  Id. at 67-
68, 266 P.3d at 1172-73. 
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that Cornelison’s claim 
that counsel was ineffective for not moving for a continuance so that Cooper’s 
report could be submitted was disproved by the record.  The district court in the 
criminal case specifically found that Cooper’s report had been submitted on 
November 21, 2013, four days before sentencing.  (R., pp. 232-33; see also 
#41715 Confidential Exhibits, pp. 75-89.1)  The record of the criminal case 
disproved Cornelison’s claim.2 
Likewise, Cornelison’s claim that counsel’s argument was ineffective is 
disproven by the record.  The mental health evidence was before the district 
court, which considered it, but ultimately imposed the sentence it did to protect 
the community.  In denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court stated that “the 
 
                                            
1 The appeal in the criminal case is Docket No. 41715.  The district court took 
judicial notice of the PSI in that case, although no copy of the PSI was introduced 
in the record in this case.  (R., pp. 118, 256, 278.) 
 
2 Cornelison attempts to rebut the district court’s finding, made in the criminal 
case, that it had the PSI addendum at the time of sentencing, by attaching a copy 
of the addendum to his brief.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 43.)  Even if the procedural 
bars to presenting new evidence to the appellate court were ignored, review of 
the document attached to the brief shows that the “received” stamp is by the 
Department of Correction.  That the Department of Correction stamped a copy of 
the addendum as received on November 25 does not rebut the district court’s 
finding that the document was received by the court on November 21.  (See 
#41715 Confidential Exhibits, p. 75 (showing a court clerk received stamp of 
November 21, 2013).) 
9 
 
Defendant’s mental health status was but one of many factors considered by the 
Court in determining the proper sentence in this case” and that the court 
“concluded that the Defendant presents a substantial risk to the Twin Falls 
community.”  (R., p. 234 (denial of Rule 35 motion).)  Because the district court in 
the criminal case specifically found it had considered the mental health evidence 
presented and concluded that Cornelison was a substantial risk to the community 
based on his horrible record of drinking and driving, the district court in the post-
conviction case rightly concluded that Cornelison’s claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in failing to argue mental health more in sentencing was disproven by 
the record. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Cornelison’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 25th day of January, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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